Georgia Voices: Brief in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

Monday, February 27, 2012

Brief in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

In the Superior Court of Fulton County

State of Georgia

DAVID FARRAR,

Petitioner,

vs.

BARACK OBAMA

Respondent

Civil Action File Number

2012 CV 211398

Brief in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

The appeal from the Secretary of State’s decision finding that President Obama is qualified to appear on the Presidential Preference Primary ballot is one in a long line of persistent challenges filed across the country since 2008. Not a single challenge has ever been upheld.[1]

An effort to harass the President continues with qualification challenges filed across the country and in Georgia. Challengers ignore procedural and evidentiary requirements because their claims are without merit, based on fantasy, and offered in pursuit of a political agenda. See, for example, Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp.2d 1363, 1364 (M.D. Ga. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 892848 (11th Cir. March 15, 2010) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2830 (2009)(“When a lawyer uses the courts as a platform for political agenda disconnected from any legitimate legal cause of action, that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law.”)

President Obama was a United States citizen from the moment of his birth in Hawaii. Since he held citizenship from birth, all Constitutional qualifications have been met. Ankeny v. Governor of State of Indiana, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. App., 2009); see, United States v. Marguet-Pillado, 648 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9^th Cir., 2011). There is no basis to question the President’s citizenship or qualifications to hold office.

Specially appearing before this Court, respondent show that petitioner’s actions should be dismissed as they have been in numerous cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, failure of service of process, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(1), (5), and (6).

I. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

A. THE STATE OF GEORGIA MAY NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER A POLITICAL PARTY’S CHOICE OF NAMES TO INCLUDE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE PRIMARY.

The Democratic Party of Georgia, a political party as defined by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(25), participates in the Georgia Presidential Preference Primary “so that electors may express their preference for one person to be the candidate for nomination … for the office of President of the United States.” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-191. No one is elected to any office, nor is anyone nominated to run for any office, as a result of the Presidential Preference Primary. Nomination of a candidate for the office of President will occur at the national convention in Charlotte, NC during the week of September 3, 2012.

The Democratic Party of Georgia determines names to include on its Presidential Preference Primary ballot at its sole discretion. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193. A state political party “enjoys a constitutionally protected freedom which includes the right to identify the people who constitute this association that was formed for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs and to limit the association to those people only.” See Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 50 U.S. 107, 101 S.Ct. 1010, 1019, 67 L.Ed.2d 82 (1981). Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526, 1530-1 (11th Cir. 1992). First amendment associational rights of a political party are most often litigated in the context of a party refusing to allow a name to appear on a primary ballot (such as in Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin or Duke v. Cleland) but the reverse is also true: a political party enjoys the exclusive right to dictate names on its primary ballot. The right to associate not only contemplates the ability to exclude but, necessarily, who to include.

Apportionment of delegates as a result of preference primary results constitutes an internal party matter. The State of Georgia may not interfere with “the traditionally recognized autonomy of the political party's internal decision-making.” Belluso v. Poythress, 485 F.Supp. 904, 912 (N.D. Ga., 1980); Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir., 1992).

B. THE QUALIFICATIONS CHALLENGE STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE PRIMARY.

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-5 does not apply to the Presidential Preference Primary. The preference primary is not an election: by its terms, the preference primary is simply an opportunity for electors “to express their preference for one person to be a candidate for nomination.” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-191. The election code defines “election” as “any general or special election and shall not include a primary or special primary unless the context in which the term is used clearly requires clearly requires that a primary or special primary is included. “ O.C.G.A. § 21-2-2(5). Neither the preference statute nor the definition reference the Presidential Preference Primary. Nothing in the context of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-5 “clearly requires” applicability to the preference primary.”

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-5 applies when a candidate is “certified by the state executive committee of a political party or … files a notice of candidacy.” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-5(a). Neither occurred here. (Certification of candidates by a party executive committee refers to the qualification procedure in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-154(a) and the payment of qualifying fees, neither of which apply to preference primaries.) No fees may be charged for listing a name on the preference ballot. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-198. There is no qualifying nor does a political party file a certification of its qualified candidates, as it would in an election. See, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-154. The state executive committee simply lists names that it wishes to have on the preference primary ballot. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193.

II. SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND PETITION FOR REVIEW UPON AN ATTORNEY REPRESENTING A PARTY IS INSUFFICIENT

The return of service filed with the Court shows that service of the summons and complaint was made by mailing to respondent’s attorney. Petitioner did not seek a waiver of personal service as authorized by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(d) nor did it attempt personal service using the methods specified by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e) or 4(f). "Where there is no process and no waiver of process, no valid suit arises." State Hwy. Dept. v. Noble, 220 Ga. 410, 414, 139 S.E.2d 318 (1964).

III. THE PETITION FOR REVIEW DOES NOT STATE CLAIMS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT

The proper party respondent when challenging a qualification decision made by the Secretary of State is the Secretary of State. In order to grant the relief sought by the petitioner the Secretary of State needs to be before the court. He is not. See, for example, Handel v. Powell, 284 Ga. 550 (2008), in which the only parties in the appeal were the Secretary of State and the challenger of the Secretary’s decision.

The relief sought by the petitioner is relief from a decision of the Secretary of State. In paragraphs 13 and 15 of the review petition petitioner seeks to stay the action of the Secretary of Stay. The petition does not seek any relief against the President, but only against the Secretary. In order to grant relief, the Civil Practice Act requires the issuance of a summons signed by the clerk of court in order for the court to exercise power granting relief. The issuance of process signed by the clerk is a necessary part of acquisition of jurisdiction. OCGA § 9-11-8 (a) (2) (A); Schafer v. Wachovia Bank of Georgia, 248 Ga.App. 466, 546 S.E.2d 846 (2001). No summons commands appearance by the Secretary of State in this matter. The lack of personal jurisdiction over the Secretary of State deprives this Court of jurisdiction to grant relief. Bonner v. Bonner, 272 Ga.App. 545, 533 S.E.2d 72 (2000); Wilkinson v. Udinsky, 242 Ga.App. 464, 530 S.E.2d 215 (2000); Guerrero v. Tellez, 242 Ga.App. 354, 529 S.E.2d 639 (2000). Jurisdiction over the Secretary of State must be established before the court can enter any ruling binding a party such as the Secretary of State or the ruling is declared null and void. See Estate of Marjorie C. Thurman v. Dodaro, 169 Ga.App. 531, 532(1), 313 S.E.2d 722 (1984). Knowledge that the suit exists does not substitute for compliance with service of process statute. Williamson v. Basenback, 298 Ga.App. 567, 680 S.E.2d 577 (2009).

The relief sought by the petition is directed against the Secretary of State, not the President. The complaint does not state a claim against the President.

IV. CONCLUSION

Respondent specially appears in this Court to show that the petition for review should be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

This 27th day of February, 2012.

_________________________________

MICHAEL JABLONSKI

Georgia State Bar Number 385850

2221-D Peachtree Road NE

Atlanta, Georgia 30309

404-290-2977

michael.jablonski@comcast.net

[1] See, Georgia cases: Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp.2d 1363 (M.D. Ga. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 892848 (11th Cir. March 15, 2010) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2830 (2009); Terry v. Handel, 08cv158774S (Superior Court Fulton County, 2008), appeal dismissed, No. S09D0284 (Ga. Supreme Court), reconsideration denied, No. S09A1373; Cook v. Good et al, 4:2009cv00082, 2009 WL 2163535 (M.D.Ga. July 16, 2008).

Federal cases: Allen v. Soetoro, 4:09-cv-00373, 2011 WL 2130589, (D. Ariz. May, 2010); In re: American Grand Jury, 3:09mc00215(USDC Tenn., 2009); Keyes v. Obama, 8:09-cv-00082, 2009 WL 3861788, (U.S.D.C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009), appeal pending, No. 10-55084 (9^th Cir., 2011); Berg v. Obama et al, 574 F.Supp.2d 509 (E.D.Pa. 2008), aff’d, 586 F.3^rd234 (3rd Cir. 2009), Cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1030 (2009); Berg v. Obama, 656 F. Supp.2d. 107 (D.D.C. Cir. 2009); Beverly v. Federal Elections Commission, 09-15562 (E.D. Cal., 2008), aff’d 09-15562 (9^th Cir., 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1732 (2010); Bowhall v. Obama, 2:10cv00609, 2010 WL 4932747, (M.D. Ala. November 30, 2010); The Church of Jesus Christ Christian/Aryan Nations of Missouri et al v. Obama et al, 6:08cv03405, 2011 WL 4916569 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 17, 2011); Cohen v. Obama, 1:08cv02150, 2008 WL 5191864 (D.D.C., Dec. 11, 2008), aff’d, 2009 WL 2870668 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Cook v. Good et al, 4:2009cv00082, 2009 WL 2163535, (M.D. Ga. July 16, 2008); Cook v. Simtech,, 8:2009cv01382 (M.D. Fla., 2009); Craig v. U.S., 5:09-cv-00343 (W.D. Okla., 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 141 (2009); Craig v. U.S., 5:09-cv-01345-c (W.D. Okla., 2010); Dawson v. Obama, 2:08cv02754, 2009 WL 532617 (E.D. Cal. March 2, 2009); Ealey v. Sarah Obama, 4:08-mc-00504 (S.D.Tex., 2008); Essek v. Obama, 08-379-GFVT (E.D. Ky., 2008); Hamblin v. Obama, 2:09cv00410, 2009 WL 2513986 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2009); Hamrick v. Fukino, 1:08-cv-00544, 2009 WL 1404535 (Haw., May 20, 2009); Herbert v. Obama, 3:08-cv-01164-HES-TEM (M.D. Fla., 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 562 (2009); Herbert v. US, 3:08-cv-00634-TJC-MCR (M.D.Fla., 2008); Herbert v. US, 3:08cv01201, 2009 WL 129585, (S.D.Cal., Jan. 15, 2009); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F. Supp.2d 63 (D.N.H. 2008); Hollister v. Soetoro, 601 F. Supp.2d 179 (D.D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1017 (2011); Hunter v. U.S. Supreme Court, 2:08cv00232, 2009 WL 111683, (N.D.Tex., Jan. 16, 2009), appeal dismissed, No. 09-10246, No. 10-10009, No. 10-100064 (5^th Cir., 2009); Jones v. Obama, 2:10-cv-01075 (C.D. Cal., 2010); Judy v. McCain, 2:08cv01162 (USDC Nev., 2008); Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204 (D.N.J. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 663 (2010); Liberty Legal Foundation v. DNC, CH-11-1757 (D Ariz., 2011); Mackay v. Obama, 2:11-cv-05458-JP (E.D. Pa., 2011), voluntarily dismissed, No. 11-3862 (USDC Pa., 2011); McLanahan v. Obama, 2:11-cv-00374-EFS (D.Was., 2011); Morrow v. Barak Humane Obama, 1:08-cv-22345 (S.D. Fla., 2008); Neely v. Obama, 2:08-cv-15243 (E.D.MI., 2008); Patriot’s Heart Network v. Soetoro, 1:09-mc-00442-RCL (D.D.C., 2009); In Re Paul Andrew Mitchell, 2:08-cv-04083 (E.D. PA, 2008),aff’d 304 Fed. Appx 113, 2008 WL 5381436 (3^rd Cir., 2008), mandamus denied, No. 08-4443 (3d Cir., 2008); Purpura v. Sebelius, 3:10-cv-04814, 2011 WL 1547768, (D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2011); Rhodes v. Gates, 5:09-cv-00703-XR (W.D.Tex., 2009); Rhodes v. MacDonald, 670 F. Supp.2d 1363 (M.D. Ga. 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 892848 ( 11^th Cir. March 15, 2010) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2830 (2009); Robinson v. Bowen, 567 F.Supp.2d 1144 (N.D.Cal. 2008); Roy v. Fed. Election, 2:08cv01519, 2008 WL 4921263, (W.D. Wa. Nov. 14, 2008); Stamper v. US, 1:08 CV 2593, 2008 WL 4838073 (N.D.OH. 2008); Strunk v. Patterson, 1:08cv04289 (E.D.N.Y., 2008), appeal dismissed No. 08-5422 (2d Cir. Nov. 14, 2008); Strunk v. U.S. Dept. of State, 693 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. Cir. 2010), mandamus denied, No. 09-5322 (D.D.C., 2009), appeal dismissed, No. 10-5092, (DC Cir., 2010); Super American Grand Jury, 1:09-mc-00346-RCL (D.D.C., 2009) ; Taitz v. Obama, 707 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. Cir. 2010), appeal pending, No. 11-5304 (DC Cir., Oct. 31, 2011); Taitz v. Astrue, 1:11-cv-00402, 2011 WL 3805741, (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2011); Taitz v. Astrue, 1:11-mc-00158 (D.Haw., 2011); Taitz v. Ruemmier, 1:11-cv-01421 (D.D.C., 2011); Thomas v. Hosemann, 1:08mc00280 (D. Haw., 2008); Thomas v. Hosemann, 2:08-cv-00241-KS-MTP (SD Miss., 2008).

State cases: Ankeny v. Daniels, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) Aff’d, No. 49A02-0904-CV-353 (Ind. App. Court); Brockhausen v. Andrade, No. 08-1001-C365 (Tex. State Court); Broe v. Reed, 82473-8 (Was. State Supreme Court); Connerat v. Browning, 999 So. 2d 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Connerat v. Obama, No. 09003103SC (Fla. State Court); Connerat v. Obama, No. 09005522SC (Fla. State Court); Constitution Party v. Lingle, No. 29743, 2008 WL 5125984 (Haw. Dec. 5, 2008); Corbett v. Bowen, No. 30-2008-00114112-CU-FR_CJC, (Cal. Superior Court, 2008); Craig v. Oklahoma, MA-109808 (Okla. Supreme Court); Donofrio v. Wells, No. AN-1053-08T2 (NJ. Nov. 03, 2008), Cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 752 (2008); Fitzpatrick v. Obama, no docket number (NC State Court); Greenberg v. Brunner, No. 2008cv1024 (Ohio State Court, 2008); In re John McCain’s Ineligibility to be on Presidential Primary Ballot in Pa, 944 A.2d 75 (Pa. 2008); Justice v. Fuddy, 253 P.3d 665 (Haw. 2011); Keyes v. Bowen, 189 Cal. App. 4^th 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) Cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 99 (2011); US v. LTC Terrence L. Lakin, MCAT-JA-SC; Liberty Legal Foundation v. DNC, CH-11-1757 (Tenn. State Court); Lightfoot v. Bowen, No. 168690 (Cal. Supreme Court, 2008), Cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1151 (2009); Marquis v. Reed, No. 08-2-34955-1 (Was. State Court, 2008); Martin v. Lingle, No. 29414, 2008 WL 4684786, (Haw. Oct. 22, 2008); Martin v. Lingle, No. ICC08-1-002147, 2009 WL 1669050, (Haw. Jun. 9, 2009), Appeal Dismissed, 2009 WL 2372096 (Haw. Aug. 3, 2009); Martin v. Bennett, No. 1CC10-1-000969 (Haw. State Court); Meroni et al v. McHenry County Grand Jury Foreman et al, No. 09mr399 (Ill. State Court, 2009); Neal v. Brunner, No. 2008cv72726 (Ohio State Court, 2008); Patriot’s Heart Media Network v. Illinois Board of Elections, No. 10H000605 (Ill. State Court); Schneller v. Cortes, 199 MM 2008 (Pa. Supreme Court, 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2830 (2009); Sorsensen v. Riley, cv-2008-1906 (Ala. State Court, 2008); Spuck v. Sec. of State, 2008 cv1116 (Ohio State Court, 2008); Stumpo v. Granholm, No. 08-140-MM (Mich. Dist. Ct. (30th) Mar. 31, 2009), appeal dismissed, No. 291681, (Mich. App. Ct., Jun. 3, 2009); Stunk v. Patterson, 029641/2008 (N.Y. State Court, 2008); Strunk v. Patterson, 029642/2008 (N.Y. State Court, 2008); Sullivan v. Sec. of State, 08cv1076 (N.C. State Court, 2008); Sullivan v. Marshall, 08cvs-021393 (N.C. State Court, 2008); Taitz v. Fuddy, 1cc11-1-001731 (Haw. State Court); Terry v. Handel, 08cv158774S (Superior Court Fulton County, 2008), appeal dismissed, No. S09D0284 (Ga. Supreme Court), reconsideration denied, No. S09A1373; Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz, SC 18264 (Conn. Supreme Court, 2008).

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Case of James McClure as submitted by Publius, 1811

Richmond, Virginia

THE ALEXANDRIA HERALD

Monday, OCTOBER 7, 1811

CASE OF JAMES McCLURE.

The Case of this man has made a good deal of stir in the U. States -- and has lately been received by a letter from a Mr. John Rodman, dated Paris, 4th, Jule, 1811, and addressed to the Editor of the United States Gazette

The facts appear to be these:

James McClure was born in the U.S. , on the 21st of April, 1785. Some months after his birth (that is, on the 30th Feb 1786) his father was duly naturalized, under the laws of the State of South Carolina.

The son remained in the U.S. until the year 1795 when he was sent to England for his education. He has not since returned to this country; but resided for some years in England, and then made a trip to Holland and some other parts of the continent. His father also has left the U.S. and returned to his native country: G. Britain.

Some time in the year 1807, Mr. James McClure, dispatched from England, the famous ship "Horizon", destined to Lima, which was shipwrecked on the "rocks of Morlaix," and, as is generally known, was the very first case to which the Berlin Decree was put into execution against the U.S. Mr. McC. went to France to reclaim his property of the ship; carrying with him a Passport from the American Minister of London, confessing him to be a native citizen of the U.S.

On the 12th April, 1810, an order was issued by the Minister of War, directing, "that in consequence of information to (him) from the minister of general police, and which he has received from the Minister plenipotentiary of the U. States, Mr. James McC. should be detained in France as an 'English prisoner of France.'" Accordingly, he was arrested at L'Orient , sent under parole, and placed under surveillance at Tours. Gen. Armstrong would not interfere in his behalf.

On the 16th March, 1810 he writes him that the certificates of his father's naturalization, and of his own birth and baptism, were not sufficient; they only prove that his father is an American Citizen, and that he himself was born in the US, and that "the evidence that will reach the case & substantiate (his) claim, is a certified copy of the act of S.Carolina, 'naturalizing' (his) father, provided that the "act naturalizes also the children of (his) "father born before his own date:"

Mr. Rodman afterwards met with Mr. McClure at Tours, and being touched with his situation, determined to intercede with Gen. A. on his return to Paris. The general was however about to leave France --- and Mr. R. thought fit to address himself to Mr. Russell, Charge d'affaires at Paris.

In reply, Mr. R. tell him that, "Mr. McC must claim to be a citizen of the United States either under a law thereof, or under a law of the state of S. Carolina; that Gen. A. not considering the law of the U.S. to embrace the case of Mr. McC., required that he should show himself to be within the provisions of the state statute: that the words, 'if dwelling in the U.S.' appear to occasion the whole difficulty in deciding on the rights of Mr. McC.

" 'Is this dwelling'" (continues Mr. R.) "to be at the time of the naturalization of the father, at or after passing the law, or the time of claiming to be considered a citizen? Gen. Armstrong, it seems, decided against the first, and the two last are conclusive against Mr. McClure. As I act under Gen. A. in this legation, it is not competent in me to admit appeals from his judgement."

Mr. Rodman also applied to Mr. McRae, our consul in Paris, to whose department the granting of passports had been transferred. Their correspondence went off upon a subordinate point, which it is not necessary to state. It is certain, these applications did no good to Mr. McC. who yet remains perhaps under surveillance at Tours.

In my Judgement, however, our minister has erred in his decision -- and Mr. McClure ought to have been held as a citizen of the United States. Mark! We are not considering what the law ought to be; but what it is. If the case of Mr. McClure comes within any of the U.S. Acts, it is the 4th section of the Act of April, 1802 -- which is in these words:

"The 'children' of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States, or who previous to the passing of any law on the subject, by the government of the United States, may have become citizens of any one of the said states, 'under the law' and, thereof, being 'under the age' of twenty-one years, at the time of their parent's being so naturalized, or admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, 'if dwelling in the U.S.' be considered as Citizens of the United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the U.States: 'Provided,' that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never resided within the U.States, &c,&c."

And, now, what is the case of James McC?

His father was a citizen of the state of S. Carolina, before any act was passed by the United States "on the subject."

James McClure is then the child of a naturalized citizen. He was "under the age of 21 at the time of his naturalization." So far his case is within the law. The only doubt is, as Mr. Russel says, as to the expression: "if dwelling in the United States." When must he have dwelt in the United States? To what period of time does the section point? If to the time of "passing the law," the expression would not have been vague -- Congress would have put in some definite phrase, as "at this time" or "now," as they do immediately after in the same section. If to the "time of claiming" to be considered a citizen," then is the party both a citizen and not a citizen; a citizen in the United States, but not one out -- in which case, the citizen father has greater rights than his citizen son, because the father has all the rights of one, both within the United States and elsewhere. By the same rule it is that if a man were to be naturalized for 20 years, and then to marry and have a child, that child could not dwell in a foreign country without an absolute forfeiture of his rights. It is doubtful whether the legislature of the United States have ever contemplated such a state of things.-- for by this rule, thousands who are now considered as citizens would really cease to be such.

To my eye, the spirit of the act appears to be this: that the child should be with the parents, dwelling in the United States with him at the time of his naturalization. Thus distinguishing between those children who are with him at time, and those whom he has left behind him in his native country. The law naturalizes the former with him by saying grace once over them, as Dr. Franklin said: presuming that as they are here at that time, they will remain here for life; but the same grace does not extend to those who have remained behind.

Mr. Rodman hints, that it would have been sufficient for James McClure to have been born in the United States . He is mistaken. The law of the United States recognizes no such claim.

The law of Virginia, of 1792, does -- for, "'all free persons born' within the territory of this commonwealth," is deemed a citizen. The law of Virginia considers him as a son of the soil. An alien, as well as a citizen, may beget a citizen, but the U.States' act doesn't go so far. A man must be naturalized to make his children such.

If it be said that the law is defectives, we shall not dispute the point. We shall not say, but that it ought to deprive every naturalized foreigner of the privileges with which it had clothed him, provided he returns for a certain series of years to that native domicile he had abandoned. And again, might there not be an United States' expatriation law? For, as we permit a man to enjoy the rights of a freeman to move from his country to that call of his own interests, we ought also to permit him to snap the ties which bind him to that country. Thus, if found in arms against us, would he not be treated as a rebel, instead of a prisoner of war?

These ideas are suggested with a considerable diligence. The case of James McClure is clearly a nice one -- and even if I had not the best reasons to ascribe the purest motives to general Armstrong in this transaction, still there is that dubious complexion in the case which might lead me to think, that a very honest and enlightened man might honestly differ with me on the occasion.

Publius, aka: James Madison

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Monday, February 27, 2012

Brief in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

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